回魂夜

A |     Global consulting giant McKinsey & Company advised several painkillers producers for 15 years on how to "turbocharge" prescription drug sales largely to blame for starting the opioid epidemic in the US, The New York Times has revealed citing over 100,000 documents.,The docs emerged as a part of a settlement deal that McKinsey signed with several state attorneys that sued the company.,Apart from working with Endo, Purdue, and Mallinckrodt, the company also provided "in-depth experience in narcotics" for Johnson & Johnson subsidiaries producing controlled substances. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of US citizens died from overdose, often linked to these very drugs.,How It All Started,According to the disclosed documents, McKinsey helped both Endo and Purdue, the creators of two of the most widespread opioid-based drugs for severe chronic pain, to launch their products Opana and OxyContin in 2006-2008. The firm even advised one of the companies on how to overcome a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) block which it had encountered in 2008.,The FDA blocked Purdue's attempt to release an upgraded version of its OxyContin, which was more difficult to snort or dilute and inject in bloodstream – two methods of the prescription drug's abuse that already had been devised by some of its recipients. In order to help Purdue get the license, McKinsey interviewed an ex-drug dealer on the medication's abuse, prepared docs and even coached the drug firm's officials for meetings with the FDA as the pharmaceutical company knew its drug had been widely abused, the docs suggest.,Crack Pipes: Biden Administration's Handling of US Opioid Crisis Raising Questions, Journo Says15 February, 13:00 GMT,Purdue's main competitor, Endo, also released a new version of its painkiller and tried to get it marked as resistant to crushing (for snorting) and diluting (for injections), but the FDA did not allow the latter citing lack of such properties. Nonetheless, the drug's release was a success and coincided with a drop in abuse-resistant OxyContin's sales.,This came, however, at a cost of local epidemics of previously unseen blood disorders in several US states in 2012 – patients were found to be anemic and suffered from kidney failure. Many of them admitted to abusing updated Opana – the new formulae indeed discouraged from snorting it, but still allowed injection abuse. However, the same component that prevented crushing took a great toll on those who tried to inject the drug to get a better high, leading to red blood cells' destruction and organ damage.,Going on the 'Offensive',The consulting company's involvement in the opioid crisis did not stop at helping the companies to launch their products – it also helped them to boost the sales.,While the pills like the ones produced by Endo, Purdue and Mallinckrodt were originally advertised as not causing additions, US doctors were not always prone to prescribing them, especially when a patient's pain was neither severe nor chronic. According to the revealed documents, McKinsey's consultants helped Purdue, and several other companies, including two J&J subsidiaries, to overcome this "problem".,Starting in 2009, McKinsey developed a "segmentation" strategy for Purdue: its analysts divided the company's customers into groups based on their potential thoughts of the product and then formed distinct messages for each group. The customers in this case were doctors prescribing painkillers and the product was opioid drugs. The strategy targeted even doctors who resorted to opioids only in most extreme cases, ensuring them of OxyContin's safety and trying to convince them that there was no point in making their patients suffer.,The consulting company proposed to achieve this by "[raising] physician comfort levels through appropriate education and support". Purdue tried to convince these doctors that their colleagues had no issues prescribing OxyContin.,By 2014, the US government started to realize a nascent opioid drug problem was underway and introduced new labeling requirements for such drugs as well as instructions to use them only in cases of severe of chronic pain. Around the same time, OxyContin sales started to decline, prompting Purdue to ask for McKinsey's help once again – this time to overcome the government's policy and precautions.,The consultants identified the problem as the company promoting its drug as a less potent opioid amid rampant drug abuse and advised to shift to the "offense" instead, the documents show. They namely advised focusing the salesmen efforts on doctors, who were likely to prescribe OxyContin to a new client not previously taking opioid drugs.,"Physicians with higher OxyContin NBRx to Rx ratio may be more likely to initiate a patient on OxyContin", an extract from a McKinsey presentation for Purdue from January 2014 said.,Around the same time and amid the 2015 HIV concentrated outbreaks in several states linked to the opioid drugs abuse via injections, McKinsey consulted Endo on promoting its Opana. The company was not concerned about what the CDC named "explosive transmission" of HIV and the Opana's role in it, according to the documents. On the contrary, in summer 2015, it helped Endo rededicate most of its salesmen from other products into a "Sales Force Blitz" – the company almost solely dedicated to selling Opana to around 3,000 physicians in the US.,One of McKinsey's consultants was excited over the creation of the "Force", claiming in correspondence with the head of Endo’s painkiller unit that the "fun [begins] on Monday!" with the latter responding "agreed, the fun is just beginning".,Playing Both Sides,One of the strangest revelations in the documents uncovered by the New York Times is that McKinsey managed to play both sides of the opioid crisis tragedy – helping pharmaceutical companies sell more of "not-so-addiction-resistant" drugs, while also assisting the FDA, other government agencies and state governments, in the fight against the epidemic.,In 2017, the FDA finally decided to pull one of the drugs, the more potent Opana, from the market, but not until it made $844 million in revenue with help from McKinsey and played a role in the deaths of thousands of Americans, considered to be the victims of the opioid epidemic. Paradoxically, the same year, McKinsey Senior Partner Tom Latkovic lamented about doctors prescribing opioid painkillers left and right at a health care conference.,"Why do we continue to prescribe, dispense, pay for opioid prescriptions to people that we know, or at least we could know, have an incredibly high propensity to abuse them?" Latkovic wondered.,The bizarre divergence between what McKinsey was advising to the pharmaceutical companies and Latkovic's rhetoric is explained by the fact that he was not a member of the consulting company's pharmaceutical practice, which worked with pharma.,Instead, he and his team worked with state governments and health systems to pin down the ways of tackling the opioid crisis, The New York Times said citing two local officials, who used to work on the issue. Their work, however, was partly complicated by McKinsey's pharmaceutical wing, which wanted to greenlight their draft publications in case they could damage their clients.,North Carolina Rep. Claims Opioid Crisis 'Affects Every Community' in US Amid Drug Trafficking Surge19 December 2021, 01:36 GMT,Eventually in 2019, McKinsey finally stopped advising its top client, Perdue, but not until their ties became public during one of the litigations related to the opioid epidemic and initiated by US authorities. One such litigation eventually had McKinsey pay $600 million in settlement without admitting guilt, as well as release the documents related to its work with the pharmaceutical companies.。    1937年的红军，说一句“穷得揭不开锅”都算客气了，那时期是真正意义上的财政赤字。

B |     就在这当口，一笔“天降横财”从法国寄到了上海——整整80万美金，折算成其他货币，直接超过了100万，这是共产国际给陕北的救命钱。

C |     但问题也立刻来了：钱在上海，延安在陕北，中间横着的不是路，是蒋介石布下的天罗地网，层层封锁、道道哨卡，明里暗里全是眼睛。这钱怎么运？谁敢运？        01神秘的“铁算盘”    当时组织把这道送命题交给了一个“专业对口”的人——毛泽民，也就是毛主席的二弟。

D |     他更重要的身份，是党内公认的“铁算盘”。他小时候就跟着父亲毛贻昌学记账、算收支，别人玩泥巴，他算铜板；别人看热闹，他盯流水。    1931年中华苏维埃共和国刚成立，国家银行连门牌都没挂好，行长人选却先定下来了——毛泽民。结果这位行长上任两个月，把银行从无到有盘活了，账目清楚、发行顺畅，连印钞机都安排得明明白白。    长征那会儿，更是把“国家财政”挑在肩上走。160多副扁担，挑着黄金、白银、银元、纸币，外加一台印钞机，一路翻山越岭，硬生生走到陕北。    战士们给这支队伍起了个外号，叫“扁担上的国家银行”。这不是比喻，是实打实的财政部随军转移。    所以，这次80万美金的任务，看着凶险，其实是专业对口。毛泽民接手后，没有豪言壮语，只有一套极其冷静的想法：拆分、转账、换汇、隐蔽流转，能绕的绕，能藏的藏。        02运钱大计    钱在上海，但真正的难题，从来不是“有没有钱”，而是“怎么花、怎么动、怎么不被盯上”。毛泽民心里清楚，在这个十里洋场，最危险的不是没身份，而是身份不够体面。    于是，他没有第一时间去找船、找车、找地下党，而是先在上海“闲逛”了好几天，最后把目光锁定在外滩的金融俱乐部。    那地方，说白了就是当年的“高端金融会所”，银行家、洋行经理、买办、富商天天泡在里头，喝的是洋酒，聊的是汇率和航运。    毛泽民给自己换了一身行头，西装笔挺，皮鞋锃亮，往那一站，谁看了都觉得：这人不像搞革命的，更像搞钱的。

E |     他进去之后也不急着谈正事，先喝酒、寒暄、聊行情，话不多，但句句在点上。别人聊利润，他能顺着往下接；别人聊风险，他能顺手补一刀。

F |         几次下来，在圈子里慢慢有了印象：这位先生不显山不露水，但脑子清楚，是个“靠谱的生意人”。    几个月混下来，关系一条条搭起来了，毛泽民甚至拿到了几家外国商社的签字说明。    这个东西看着不起眼，却是护身符——有了它，他用美金买货、做账、走交易流程，都合情合理。外人一看，只会以为这是在替洋行办事的中国买办，谁也不会往“革命经费”上想。

G |     更绝的是，他把家庭也一起“搬”进了上海。妻子钱希均随后到位，摇身一变成了“老板娘”，夫妻俩在十里洋场正式“落户”。    表面上，他们经营的是纸张生意，进出账目清清楚楚，生意往来频繁；暗地里，却悄悄搭起了一张资金转运网，把钱一层层往安全方向挪。

H |     03一生未解之谜    钱一到延安，蒋介石那边就炸了锅。

I | 80万美金，不是毛毛雨，是能买炮、买粮、养部队的“救命钱”。

J |     更要命的是，这笔钱像凭空蒸发了一样——从上海遁入了迷雾，从国民党的视线里彻底消失。    蒋介石一拍桌子，下了死命令：查！往死里查！    查了几年，账没问题、人没问题、路也没问题。

K | 上海滩该赚钱的还在赚钱，该倒闭的照样倒闭。

L | 那笔钱，像一阵风，吹过了，却抓不住影子。这事儿慢慢就成了蒋介石心里的一根刺——不疼不痒，但一碰就难受。    据说蒋介石晚年在台湾，还念叨过这事。        1938年，毛泽民被派往新疆从事统战工作，化名“周彬”。那是一片政治气候极不稳定的地方，新疆军阀盛世才一开始亲苏亲共，后来风向一变，立刻翻脸。    1942年，毛泽民被捕入狱。敌人对他严刑拷打，逼他交代党的组织和经费的藏匿之处。    他什么都没说。算盘能算账，骨头却更硬。    最终，毛泽民被秘密杀害，年仅47岁。

M | 他没等到解放战争的胜利，也没看到新中国成立的那一天。

N |     但那笔钱、那套金融战的智慧，却实实在在撑起了一段最艰难的岁月。    返回，查看更多。